Dynamic Programming and Mathematical EconomicsMaximum Theorems for Convex Structures with an Application to the Theory of Optimal Intertemporal Allocation, 1989, (with Tapan Mitra), Journal of Mathematical Economics , 18, 77-86.
What Do Discounted Optima Converge To? A Theory of Discount Rate Asymptotics in Economic Models,1991, Journal of Economic Theory , 55, 64-94.
Limit Integration Theorems for Monotone Functions and Parametric Continuity in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games, 1994, (with Mukul Majumdar), Nonlinear World , 1, 73-91.
Parametric Continuity in Dynamic Programming Problems, 1994, (with Mukul Majumdar and Rangarajan Sundaram), Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control , 18, 1069-1092.
Capital Allocation Models/Growth TheoryCapital Deepening and Impatience Equivalence in Stochastic Aggregative Growth Models, 1987, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control , 11, 519-530.
On Continuity of the Utility Function in Intertemporal Allocation Models: An Example, 1989, (with Tapan Mitra), International Economic Review , 30, 527-536.
Finite Horizon Optimization: Sensitivity and Continuity in Multi-Sectoral Models, 1993, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 22, 101-124.
On Specifying the Parameters of a Development Plan, 1994, in Planning and Development: Essays in Honor of Sukhamoy Chakravarty, Chapter 4, 75-98, edited by Kaushik Basu, Mukul Majumdar and Tapan Mitra, Basil Blackwell, London.
Repeated and Stochastic GamesMarkovian Equilibrium in a Class of Stochastic Games: Existence Theorems for Discounted andUndiscounted Models, 1992, (with Rangarajan Sundaram), Economic Theory , 2, 197-214.
How Different Can Strategic Models Be?, 1993, (with Rangarajan Sundaram), Journal of Economic Theory, 60, 42-61.
Tragedy of the Commons?, 1993, (with Rangarajan Sundaram), Economic Theory , 3, 413-432.
A Theory of Stopping Time Games with Applications to Product Innovation and Asset Sales, 1993, Economic Theory , 3, 743-763.
The Folk Theorem for Discounted Repeated Games: A NEU Condition, 1994, (with Dilip Abreu and Lones Smith), Econometrica , 62, 939-948.
Collusion, Discounting and Dynamic Games, 1995, Journal of Economic Theory , 66, 289-306.
A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games, 1995, Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 1-32.
(s,S) Equilibria in Stochastic Games, 1995, (with Aldo Rustichini), Journal of Economic Theory , 67, 1-39.
The Equilibrium Existence Problem in General Markovian Games, 1998, (with Rangarajan Sundaram), in Organizations with Incomplete Information, Chapter 5, 159-207, edited by Mukul Majumdar, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Mixed Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games with One-Period Memory, 2010, (with Paolo Siconolfi), International Journal of Economic Theory , 6-1, 167-187.
Prisoners Dilemma with Simultaneous Transfers, 2016 (with Paolo Siconolfi), mimeo, Columbia University.
Moral Hazard, Market SelectionOptimal Principal-Agent Contracts for a Class of Incentive Schemes: A Complete Characterization and the Rate of Approach to Efficiency, 1994, (with Roy Radner), Economic Theory , 4, 483-503.
Moral Hazard, 1994, (with Roy Radner), in Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 2, Chapter 26, 869-903, edited by Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Profit Maximization and the Market Selection Hypothesis, 1999, (with Roy Radner), Review of Economic Studies , 66, 769-798.
Survival and the Art of Profit Maximization, 2001, (with Rangarajan Sundaram), Review of Economic Design, 6, 429-446.
Economics of Climate ChangeDynamic Games with an Application to Climate Change Models, 2009, in Encyclopedia of Complexity and System Sciences, Game Theory Section, edited by Marilda Sotomayor, Springer-Verlag, Germany.
A Strategic Approach to Climate Change Agreements: Technology, Foreign Aid, and Asymmetries, 2015 (forthcoming), (with Roy Radner); in Handbook on the Economics of Climate Change, edited by Graciela Chichilnisky and Armon Rezai, Elsevier, North-Holland, Netherlands.
The Paris Accord and the Green Climate Fund: A Coase Theorem, 2017 revised 2020, (with Roy Radner), mimeo, Columbia University; under submission to Econometrica.
Asynchronous GamesCoordination Need Not Be A Problem, 2012, Games and Economic Behavior , 76, 519-534.
Asynchronous Repeated Games with Finite Memory, 2017, (with Paolo Siconolfi), mimeo, Columbia University.
Two-Sided Rejection in Finite Horizon Bargaining, 2020, mimeo, Columbia University.
Imperfect Monitoring in Asynchronous Games with Transfers, (with Paolo Siconolfi), under preparation.
MiscellaneousBankruptcy and Expected Utility Maximization, 1994, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control , 18, 539-560.
Better Late than Early: Vertical Differentiation in the Adoption of a New Technology, 1995, (with Saul Lachand Aldo Rustichini), Journal of Economic Management and Strategy , 4, 563-589.
Price Continuity Rules and Insider Trading, 1995, (with Ananth Madhavan), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , 30, 199-228.
Optimal Management of an R&D Budget, 1997, Journal of Econ Dynamics and Control , 21, 575-602.
Competition and Collusion in Dealer Markets, 1997, (with Ananth Madhavan), Journal of Finance 52, 245-276.
Strategic Analysis, 2002, in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ESOL Publishers, London, UK.
Long-Run Price Competition with Intertemporal Demand, 2007, (with Alexander Matros and Jorgen Weibull), Rand Journal of Economics , 38, 291-313.